THE PROBABLE OR THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCE AS THE TEST OF LIABILITY IN
NEGLIGENCE.
[Concluded.]
The cases on this subject in Pennsylvania fall into two
distinct classes: (i) Where the question to be determined
is whether negligence toward the plaintiff has been established by evidence showing (a) a duty of care owed the
plaintiff, (b) an absence of that degree of care which the
circumstances require the defendant to exercise; (2) where
the question is as to whether a certain injury sustained is
to be ascribed to the admitted wrong as-that legal consequence for which they are bound to compensate the sufferer.
It would be neither possible nor advantageous to attempt
to classify more than a few of the leading cases under each
head; but if it be found that the test in Hoag v. R. R. is applied without qualification only in the first, while in the second it is so modified as to practically amount to a rule requiring an admitted wrongdoer to make compensation for all the'
natural results of his acts, the subject will be cleared of much
that confuses it, the Pennsylvania courts will be brought in
substantial accord with the prevailing law on the point, and
many cases usually cited in one class of cases will be found
to be of authority only in the other. In cases of the first
class, the rule in Hoag v. R. R. is applied without qualification.
McGrew v. Stone9 and Scott v. Hunter20 are two closely
allied cases. In the first a bargeman moored his boat to a
pier of a bridge in the centre of a rapid current; from some
cause impossible to state the barge broke loose, sank, and
drifted underneath the plaintiff's boat, moored below in a
crowded basin, and injured it. There was no proof of lack
of care in the mooring, the only alleged negligent act proved
was the mooring in an exposed place. The sole question
presented was whether, in view of the exposed position of
29
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the bridge, the rapidity of the current, and the position of
the barges, he should not have foreseen that to moor his
boat as he did might probably endanger the boats below; if
so, to moor it there was negligent.
In Scott v. Hunter, the defendant blocked with his boats
passage through a lock, while the river was rapidly rising.
The increasing current swept over the dam the plaintiff's
boat, exposed to it by the delay. Here again the question
was whether the defendant's acts had any tendency to expose
the plaintiff's property to any peril. True, it was unlawful
in that it impeded him in the exercise of the right of passage
through a public water highway; but it was not negligence
unless it could be foreseen as threatening injury to the
plaintiff's boat, and this turned upon the fact of his knowledge of the approach of the flood; since he knew of it, the
increased danger demanded added care. Had it occurred
without warning it would have been an outside agent destroying the chain of cause and effect, diverting the result
of the obstruction of the canal from its natural effect, a delay,
to an extraordinary one, destruction of the boats. In
Morrison v, Davis,21 a flood, which destroyed baggage
brought within its radius of action by a delay caused by
negligence, broke the chain of events between the negligence
and the loss, there being nothing to indicate at the time of
22
the negligent act the probability of any such flood.
Thus it is seen that an extraordinary natural force will be,
if its existence is known when the act is done, not an act of
God intervening between the wrong and its result, but
merely one of the circumstances of the case in the light of
which the extent of the defendant's duty, and the amount
of care required, is to be determined. The new probabilities of'danger created by it throw upon him wider duties,
require from him new precautions, just as in contract
exceptional circumstances known to both parties render
Pa. 171.
'The result "was natural if it could have been foreseen, or if it would
have been guarded against by men of ordinary prudence using these
rights with due regard to those of others." Strong, J., as quoted in
7o Pa., p. go. Clearly the probability of danger as creating the duty
to take care to avoid it is here meant.
n20
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them liable for all damages from a breach of the contract
which the circumstances render probable; in the one case
knowledge increases the duty, in the other the scope of recovery.
The converse of this was decided in McCauley v. Logan.3
Boats were lashed to a bank with lashings sufficient in ordinary water, but were swept away by an extraordinary
flood which the lashings were insufficient to resist. The defendant had no reason to expect such a flood; he was therefore not bound to provide against it. "Legal duty does not
require precautions against unusual and extraordinary
events :" Green, J., p. 217.
In Fairbanks v. Kerr,24 the plaintiffs had piled flagstones in the street; the defendant got upon them to make
a political speech; some stones were broken by the weight
of the crowd who assembled to hear him speak. It was held,
reversing the court below, that it was a question for the jury
whether he should have foreseen that his speech would cause
crowds to assemble upon these stones in such numbers as
to threaten injury to them. Here again the question is,
Was there any such probability of danger to the plaintiff
from the defendant's acts that he was under a duty to them
to refrain from doing what he did? It is to be noted here
that he might have been indicted for a nuisance in obstructing the street. Even though an act be wrongful as a misdemeanor against the Commonwealth, or as threatening injury to a third party, it is not negligent as to the plaintiff
unless it could and should have been foreseen as likely to injure the plaintiff himself. He cannot, by tacking on to his injury a wrong to the public, or the failure to observe a measure of care due to another, acquire a right of action.
The defendant is not to be punished for his wrongful act,
unless it results in injury to one having the right to demand
that he refrain from it; nor can the plaintiff recover for an
injury except from him who was bound to protect him from
it.
In Hoag v. R. R., 25 where the so-called Pennsylvania rule
152 Pa. 2o2.
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-vas announced by Paxson, J., the facts again presented a
question as to the existence of negligence qua the plaintiff,
and so the rule was undoubtedly the correct test as applied
to the case in hand. There was a derailment caused by undoubtedly careless management, some hundreds of feet from
the plaintiff's property. Oil tanks were broken, the oil
ignited, carried down an unusually swollen stream, and so
reached and ignited the plaintiff's premises. Now, here the
defendants were not as to the plaintiff bound to conduct
their business at this place in any particular way, unless they
should foresee that a failure to properly conduct it there
would probably put the plaintiff's property in jeopardy.
There must be probability of injury to raise the duty of care,
the foresight of the normal man then became the proper test.
The plaintiff could not take an act of carelessness, no
doubt a violation of a duty owed to some one, and so
negligent as to him, and sue for injuries he had received
as a natural consequence thereof; he failed because he
could not convince the court that some injury to him
should have been foreseen as probable, and that therefore
the defendant had owed him a duty of care, and were negligent in violating it. .
In Wood v. Pa. R. R.,26 the court applied the rule in
Hoag v. R. R., without qualification, to most curious facts,
A passenger was standing on the platform of a station, apparently at a safe distance from the track. A train was approaching at a high rate of speed, without blowing a
whistle, or ringing a bell, and struck a woman who was
trying to cross the rails, and hurled her body against and injured the plaintiff. It was held that, assuming that the woman had been struck solely by reason of the negligent mode
in which the train was run, the plaintiff's injury was not legallythe consequence of the act of negligence. At firstglance
this seems to go far towards upholding the restriction of liability for an admitted wrong, to the result reasonably to be
anticipated by the wrongdoer; but a closer inspection shows
that while there was negligence, an injury resulting, and no
independent cause intervening, the negligence was the failure
to take those precautions owed as a duty, not to the plaintiff,
M177 Pa. 3o6.
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but to the woman struck by the train. The real point involved was whether the railroad company owed the plaintiff,
as passenger upon the platform, any duty to warn the
plaintiff of the approach of the train. The company, while
not guaranteeing their safety, undoubtedly owed some duty
to passengers waiting for trains upon its platform. What
is it? To protect them by the exercise of care in the management of any part of its business, a careless management of
which might reasonably be expected to imperil the passenger, to take such precautions as are reasonably sufficient to
protect the passenger from any danger which he or she may
probably be subjected to by his position as such. The decision then comes to this, that since the company could not
have anticipated any probability that the plaintiff's safety
could be affected by the absence of warning of the approach
of the train, it was under no duty to her to give any such
warning. While it owed a duty to take care, such acts fall
outside the standard of care required."
The test in Hoag v. R. R. was properly applied, the
question being the existence of negligence as between
plaintiff and defendant. In the case of Sturgis v. Kountz,2
where the question was, whether a ferry company should
foresee the probability of a horse becoming frightened while
in course of transport. If so, they will be bound to provide
guard-rail sufficient to prevent frightened horses going overboard.

And in Scott v. R. R., 29 the question being whether

the standard of care imposed upon a carrier for the protection
of goods from fire required them, in addition to maintaining
a corps of watchmen, to close each car-door tight, to avoid
the danger of a fire, so violent, sudden and near that the
sparks entered the small opening left unclosed before the
This is analogous to the case of Brooks v'. R. R., I68 Mass. 164,
where a passenger on the platform was injured by a runaway horse
which came upon the platform because of some insufficiency in the

safety gates. The court held the company were under no duty to the
passengers to maintain safety gates to protect them from such improbable occurrences. Their duty as to safety gates was to persons
seeking to cross the lines, not to passengers in their stations, who could
not be reasonably expected to be affected by their condition.
as 165 Pa. 364.
" 172 Pa. 646.
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watchmen could move the cars. It was held to be so improbable that no one could be called upon to take measures
to avoid it; contra, if a car-door had been left open while in
transit, when sparks are to be expected as a necessary incident to the running of trains. And in the ordinary cases in
which the liability of municipalities for the condition of
their streets and roads is discussed, -notwithstanding Heydrick's (J,) opinion in Shaeffer v. Township,30 which announces a doctrine much larger than the facts of the case
demanded-adopted from New England-where the right
of action is statutory, and so only direct damages can be recovered. In effect, he says the defect must be the sole
cause of the accident; this, while supportable in Massachusetts, because of the special nature of the duty and the right
of action, is quite at variance with the law of negligence in
Pennsylvania, where the duty to maintain roads exists at
common law, and where townships and other municipal
corporations, possessing a general corporate fund, are liable
to actions for failure to perform either statutory or common
law duties,
As a rule these cases turn upon the question, whether the
accident was such an ordinary incident of travel as should
have been foreseen and provided for by making and maintaining a road in such condition as to render all ordinary
3 1 Township v. Merkhoffer, 2
travel safe: Hey v. Philada,.
3
3
Tsp. v. Davis, Township v. Wagner,.4 and Davis v. Snyder,85 in which it was said: "The measure of danger is the
measure of duty," Increase of travel was held to have necessitated increased care, and made the absence of a guard rail,
where the road on one side adjoined a steep bank, negligence,
But there is no duty to anticipate extraordinary events,
sudden outside frights, and to make so perfect a road that
i5o Pa, 145.

t81 Pa. 44.

t, 71 Pa, 276.
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" 127 Pa. 184.
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such occurrences can work no harm: Kiefer v. Borough,38
8
Chartiersv. Phillips,37 Heister v. Township.
Turning now to the second class of cases-those where
the duty is undoubted-the measure of care determined, and
the violation of it established, and where the only point presented is the extent to which the wrongdoer shall answer to
party aggrieved for what has resulted from it. No case
can be found where this test of Hoag v. R. R. has been applied, or if applied, has not been so modified or added to as
to amount to a new and quite different rule.
The first and leading case is Pittsburg v. Grier39. The
city, who owned the wharf and received payment for its
use, allowed certain iron to lie upon the wharf in a position, where it would become dangerous at high water; the
plaintiff's boat was anchored at the wharf when the tide was
low. As the water rose its position became insecure. To
avoid this certain peril it was backed into the stream and
there anchored. While there, she was struck and injured
by some floating body which her captain could not see or
avoid. It was argued that since the destruction of the boat
could not have been foreseen as likely to occur, by reason of
the defect in the wharf, therefore the city should not be responsible for it. C. J. Black said: "It is not the law that
men are responsible for their negligence only to the extent
of the injuries which they knew would result from it; if it
were, there could be no recovery save for malicious wrongs."
While this is rather narrowly expressed, the contention being, not that it was necessary for the city to know of the
destruction as certain, but that they should have foreseen it
as likely to occur before they could be responsible for it.
Still, substantially, the rule in Hoag v. R. R. was urged
upon the court, and rejected.
In Kerr v. R. R., 40 the court, Thompson, C. J., giving
the opinion, held that the railroad company was not responsible for the burning of a house not directly ignited by the
so151
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sparks from its engine, but taking fire from another house
so ignited. After first quoting a measure of damages perfectly correct in cases of contract4 1 as apparently the measure of damages for negligence, he holds that the chain and
sequence of events is broken each time that the fire spreads
from one house to another; the burning of each house is
caused by the fire communicated from the other, the original
cause of the conflagration being only responsible for the
burning of the first house ignited.
This is applying with a vengeance the rule of damages in
contract-that a party is responsible for the direct results
of his breach. If followed it would restrict liability to direct
results alone.
The case was in substance reversed in Hope v,R. R,, 42 in

which it is held to be a matter for the jury to determine
whether the negligence is "by continuous operation so linked
to each successive fact as that all may be said to be one continuous operating succession of events, in which the first becomes naturally linked to the last, and to be its cause, and
then to be within the probable foresight of him' whose negligence runs through the succession to the injury."
The jury are to ascertain whether they are related "to
each other by a continuous sequence, or are broken off or
separated by a new and independent cause,"
The United States rule, as announced in Kellogg v. R. R.,
by Strong, J., is practicalty The same, viz., that it is a question for the jury to determine: "Did the facts constitute a
continuous succession of events, so linked together as to
make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury?"
Last in the line of cases in regard to liability for the
43
in which Hope v.
spread of fire comes Haverly v. R. R.,
R. R. is approved. There a fire was started in a dry stump
upon the defendant's premises some twenty feet from that
of the plaintiff; it smoldered for a day, and then was
The rule is that given by Parsons on Contract as the measure of
damage for breach of contract.
'go

Pa. 373.

u135 Pa. 5o.
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fanned by an ordinary breeze into flame, and spread to and
burned the plaintiff's timber. Mitchell, J., held that the mere
lapse of time did not break the cause of connection; the
cessations were merely apparent, making no real break in the
actual continuance of the fire; nor did the fact that both
plaintiff and defendant thought that the fire had been put
out break the chain of events. "The plaintiff did not expect
any injury because he thought the fire had been put out, not
because he did not see the danger of its spreading while it
was burning; and this was the danger that the defendant
was bound to contemplate as the natural and probable consequence of the original act, not the effect of the supposed
extinguishment subsequently."
Here we see that the defendat is answerable for all the
natural consequences of his wrong until the injurious tendencies of his act have exhausted themselves, or have been
diverted by some outside cause.
The plaintiff's conduct is to be judged by the probable
effect of what he knew, or should know, to exist. He would
be guilty of no negligence in failing to protect himself
against the dangers attendant upon a fire which appeared to
be extinguished. The supposed extinguishment could not
avail the defendant so long as the fire actually remained alive;
his negligence was not in failing to put out the fire, but in
negligently starting it. Also Mitchell, J., held that a wind,
such as was ordinarily to be expected, fanning the smoldering
flames into life, was not an intervening agent; it was but
one of those natural and usual agencies through which the
negligence was to operate to its final result. 44

" Must then a man who has carelessly started a fire answer for all
the damage that occurs till it exhaust itself, or be put out or diverted
by some extraordinary force? His original duty sets a limit to his
liability-his duty cannot extend beyond the probable effects of his
act. This is the answer to Thompson, C. I., fears of enormous liability
for slight defaults in Kerr v. R. R. A railroad where it runs through
a town owes a stringent duty of care in maintaining proper spark
arrestors, but only to those whose property is so nearly contiguous
that a normal man would foresee probable peril to it from an escape of
sparks, but none to one living miles away; for even though in the court's
opinion the fire may without any outside assistance spread to it, there
existed in advance no probability of danger to a property so distant.
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In Hogsett v. Bunting" the defendants owned a private
railroad which on a curve was intersected at two points by
the road on which plaintiff was a passenger. At the first point
a collision took place, due to an undoubtedly negligent act
,of running at a great speed without warning given, of defendants' engineer, who, having reversed the engine to prevent the collision, and finding it still imminentj shut off
steam and jumped, the jar of collision derailed one car of
the plaintiff's train, and at the same time opened the throttle
of defendants' engine; the train proceeded until stopped on
account of the derailed car, where the tracks again met; the
defendants' engine, the steam being thus turned on, backed
with increasing impetug around the curve, again collided
with the train, and injured the plaintiff. The court hdd,
as matter of law (so called), that the injuries received were
the legally proximate consequences of the first wrongful
act.

In arriving at this conclusion, Clarki 1,, who delivered
the opinion, first stated practically the rule in Hoag v,R. R.,
but he said: "The engineer would be held to have foreseen
Whatever consequences might ensue from his negligence
without the intervention of some other independent agency,
and both his employer and himself would be held for what
might, in the nature of things, occur in consequence of that
negligence, although in advance the actual result might have
seemed improbable :" Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson,.40

He

then says: "The inquiry must always be whether there was
any intermediate cause, disconnected from the primary fault,
and self-operating, which produced the injury :" Milwaukee,
etc., R. W. Co. v. Kellogg.47 Applying this test he decides

there is no such break in the chain. The first collision derailed the truck, and at the same instant opened the throttle
and turned loose the destructive agency which inflicted the
Within these limits the company is responsible for all the results
naturally following the escape of sparks. The distant landowner cannot
recover because the company owed him no duty-had, as to him, been
guilty of no negligence-not because the result was not legally proximate had he been so guilty.
4139 Pa. 374.
99 Pa. i.

"94 U. S. 469.
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injuries complained of. The negligence of the defendants'
engineer was the natural, primary and proximate cause of
the entire occurrence.
The rule in Hoag v. R. R., as thus amended and qualified,
no longer establishes the foresight of the normal man as the
test of liability; if foresight at all be important it is that
of an ideal being able to anticipate all those consequences
possible in the ordinary unassisted course of nature, no matter how apparently improbable to the ordinary average
intelligence; while announcing probability as the measure of
liability it, in fact, enforces responsibility for all natural
consequences.
If this opinion is meant to announce an interpretation of
the rule applicable to the determination of the liability of
a person for the consequences of all acts alleged to be negligent, as well as those established to be so (and there is nothing save the facts to indicate that it is restricted to the latter), it announces a range of duty, a standard of care, a degree of responsibility foreign to any system of modern law
destructive alike of freedom of individual action and of
legitimate business enterprise. It would require all men to
adopt precautions to protect all those who could be affected
by the natural results of their acts, to act so carefully that
their conduct could not possibly work injury.
No man, be he ever so prudent, could know how great
the responsibilities of his acts might be until all the natural
results of them had been exhausted or diverted. If an act
having no tendency probable to any ordinary mind should
work harm, should result in injury to another without the
co-operation of some new outside force, compensation must
be made. Such a rule would divert the whole law from its
legitimate object, of enforcing mankind to conduct their affairs with reasonable regard for the rights of others likely
to be affected thereby, into a rule requiring every individual to act at its peril, and if he injure another, to answer for it, though at the time no injury was either intended
or could have been foreseen. So great a change surely was
never intended; the case must be read by the light of its
facts-the controlling fact is that negligence was fully established; it was this which led the court to express itself
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as it did. So read it amounts to a decision that once negligence is proven, the probable anticipations of the wrongdoer cannot limit his liability; the test of that is, whether the
injury was caused by the orderly working out of the injurious tendencies of the act operating through known
natural laws of cause and effect, 48 to its final result, until

some outside agency not itself created by the wrong
intervene to divert49 the consequences to some new and different end.
Thus we find two different tests of legally proximate cause
applied as the circumstances of the cases require, and yet,
unfortunately, the principle governing their applications
so vaguely outlined that opinions in cases of the one class are
constantly cited as decisive authority where the facts clearly
fall within the other, and this not merely by counsel in argument, but by the court in giving their decisions.
In Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson,"° the dual aspect of
cause and effect, as the test of liability in negligent cases, is
recognized in a clear and masterly opinion of Gordon, J.,
His opinion expressed precisely the same thoughts as that
of Blackburn in Smith v. R. R. (supra). The defendant's
liability for the results of his well-established negligence
was to be measured by the standard of natural consequences,
-even though unforeseen; the plaintiff's conduct as being contributory negligence or not was to be judged by the standard
of the precautions reasonably necessary to guard him against
those dangers which he should have anticipated under the
circumstances of which he had or should have had knowledge. There was no attempt to lay down new rules, no idea
that there was announced any departure from the established
law; both principles had the authority of established cases:
the first that of Grier v. Pittsburg,etc., the second of Hoag
v. R. R., and kindred cases.
The company's pipes, originally bad, were broken and
made worse by the city constructing a sewer; notice was
- And this includes the known business of human beings to act in
particular ways under particular circumstances.
Not merely to hasten the attainment of its natural result. Elder v.
Lykens Valley, 157 Pa. 493.

ag9 Pa. Z.
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given, but no repairs made; the gas permeated into the
sewer, some three or four feet distant, exploded, and injured
the plaintiff, a city engineer, who entered to inspect it,
knowing the leakage, carrying a candle, which caused the
explosion. He first held the leak was the proximate cause
of the gas being in the sewer; if it were not "where was
the intervening (cause) by which the consequences of the
accident are to be shifted from the defendant to some other
person or thing?" The break in the pipe by the city was
not such a cause, for the cause was still the leaking gas,
which, after the break and notice given, had not been prevented by repairs to the pipe. He rejects the argument that
the company was responsible no further than what appeared
to its officers reasonable probability. "The company was responsible for what might, in the nature of things, occur
from its neglect, and its responsibility was not limited by
what its officers may have thought to be improbable or even
impossible." But the plaintiff, he says, was also bound to
the exercise of a reasonable care for his own safety. "We
cannot apply one rule to the company and another to the
defendant, or vary the rule concerning negligence, except
in this: the defendant was bound for the consequences of
his neglect, though those consequences were not, and could
-not, by any ordinary prudence, have been anticipated;
whilst the plaintiff was bound only to a knowledge of
the probable consequences of the facts of which he
was cognizant, and to that ordinary prudence which the
circumstances required."
If it was probable that the
gas escaping from the leak would find its way into the
sewer in quantities sufficient to produce an explosion, he
ought to have anticipated the result, and not have entered the sewer with a lighted lamp. If he did so under
the conditions stated, he was guilty of such contributory
negligence as ought to have prevented his recovery. Neither
the statement of the extent of the defendant's liability, or
the plaintiff's standard of care, involved any novel view
of legal cause and effect not already contained in the decided
cases. There was no attempt to announce any new doctrine,
nor was the standard set for the plaintiff's conduct either
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more51or less severe, because his negligence was contributory.
The case is novel only in this: that side by side are seen
the two meanings of legal consequence-the natural, for
which the wrongdoer must answer; the probable, against
which every one must guard by appropriate precaution himself and his neighbor. Each in turn is applied as a proper
test where the facts demand it, each rejected where the facts
render it inappropriate, as being either too narrow to compensate one injured by an admitted wrong, or so strict as to
unduly hamper one whose actions are sufficient to guard
against all probable dangers. This juxtaposition is very
rare in its nature; it could only occur where one proven
negligent seeks to escape liability by showing some negligence of the plaintiff contributing to cause his injury. Such
negligence may or may not break the causal chain; it always
prevents recovery. Upon a classification of the cases it is
thus found that"
i. The existence of negligence is to be judged by the
probable results of the defendant's acts foreseeable by the
normal man similarly situated. So in every instance in this
class of cases the rule in Hoag v. R. R. is applied without any
qualification or addition.
2. This once being admitted or established, the liability
for injuries sustained is to be determined by the natural consequences, those resulting from the operation of the ordinary
natural laws, animate and inanimate. So in this class of
cases the rule in Hoag v. R. R. is either not mentioned,
or is always so qualified, explained and amended as to make
the test of liability no longer the foreseeable probability, but
an unbroken natural sequence of event.
3. In Oil City v. Robinson both standards are recognized
and applied to their appropriate facts.
Thus there is no real conflict in the decisions. There is
no undue extension of responsibility for acts having no apparent tendency to do harm, as might appear upon a cur'It is the standard set in Scott v. Hunter; Fairbanks v. Kerr; Grew
v. Stone; Hoag v. R. R., etc., supra-the test universally applied for
deciding the fact of negligence, the standard of care, or the extent of
the duty.
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sory reading of Hogsett v. Bunting, and kindred cases; nor
is there any unjust restriction of recovery for injuries to the
expectation of the wrongdoer, as the rule in Hoag v. R. R.,
as broadly stated, would seem to indicate, unless properly
understood as decisive only where the existence of negligence is in question.
The only criticism of the cases is that while the final result has been in accord with authority and justice, it has
been reached not by boldly announcing the two tests probable and natural consequences as governing the decision of
the respective questions of negligence and liability therefor,
but by modifying a rule proper for the one in order to make
a sound standard of liability for the other without clearly
stating the reasons for the extension. The rule is so modified and changed where the circumstances of the case demand
it, but it is nowhere stated that the fact which requires the
change is that by these circumstances the negligence has been
established, and that only the extent of the liability for it
remains to be determined. Such is the case, but it requires
careful study to see it. There is too great a danger that this
controlling fact may be overlooked and the cases misunderstood and so misquoted as authority.
Too much is left to the analysis of the student or practitioner; there has been too little authoritative classification
of the cases by the court.
It only remains to state what is an independent intervening agent, such as has been held to break the causal connection between the wrong and injury.
Certain of the cases examined have indicated certain
requisites of such an agency-from them it appears:
i. It must be independent, self-created, not itself a product and result of the wrongful act, as was the opening of
the lever in Hogsett v. Bunting.
2. It must intervene; it must either come into existence,
or within the knowledge of the defendant, after the time the
alleged negligent act or omission took place; if it existed
to the knowledge of the actor, it becomes one of the circumstances of the case in the light of which the care required of
him is to be measured, and so may increase his scope of duty,
or exact greater precautions.52
s See Scott v. Hunter; Oil City v. Robinson.

THE TEST OF LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE.

3. The operation of natural forces does not constitute such
agency, unless of exceptional violence, so extraordinary that
human prudence would not have foreseen or provided
against them; ordinary winds, the usual freshets, even
though not known to exist when the act is done, do not
break the chain of natural cause and effect: Haverly v.
R. R. 53

4. It must divert, and not merely hasten, natural effect
of the wrong; so where the refuse of a mine was so placed
that every freshet would carry it down stream, the fact that
an extraordinary flood quickened its descent did not prevent a recovery by one upon whose land the refuse was so

thrown, though no doubt more was so cast upon it, and so
greater damage done than if it had been gradually carried
down, subsiding as it went: Elder v. Lykens Valley. 4
So it must be an independent, intervening, unusual force
diverting the natural results of the wrong to some new and
different end; it may use a condition caused by the wrong,
but it utilizes it to bring about some new consequence of its
own.
In this again the Pennsylvania courts have often rendered
decisions conflicting both inter se and with those of other
jurisdictions, rather because of their very broad power of
drawing plain inferences from undisputed facts than from
any deviation from the ordinary rule as to the nature of such
agency.
Thus we see, in Watson v. Township,55 it was held as
"matter of law" that where the negligence of the township
had caused the escape of a horse, which strayed upon a railroad track, the engine which ran it down was an intervening outside agency.
While in Sneesby v. R. R.,16 the Court of Queen's Bench
held that exactly such dangers and injuries were the natural results of causing animals to roam at large out of their
owners' control.
And in R. R. v. Trich57, a runaway horse, which ran over
U 135 Pa. 5o.
as 157 Pa. 490.
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a woman thrown by a street railway company's negligence
prone into the street, was held to be an independent intervening cause; it is, to say the least, doubtful if this is not an
ordinary peril of the position in which the negligence placed
her.
Francis H. Bohlen.

